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Against Global Governance in the WTO
John 0. McGinnis*
Mark L. Movsesian**
I. INTRODUCTION
In "Global Governance and the WTO," Professor Andrew Guzman has
done an impressive job of articulating a vision of the World Trade Organi-
zation (WTO) that many international lawyers share.' In this vision, the
WTO's mission should be expanded beyond its present task of facilitating
tariff reductions and preventing covert protectionism. Rather, the WTO should
take on substantive authority in a wide variety of non-trade areas, including
the environment, labor, human rights, and public health. Unlike many peo-
ple who share this vision, Guzman takes the time to describe how it might
best be accomplished. He advocates specialized WTO departments and peri-
odic "Mega-Rounds" in which members make cross-issue regulatory bar-
gains. Unless members agreed otherwise, these regulatory bargains would be
subject to the WTO's Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU).
The availability of the dispute settlement system is a major element of
Guzman's proposal.' Guzman argues that the mechanism could serve as an
important credibility-enhancing device that would encourage members to
make beneficial cross-issue bargains. While Guzman believes that members
should be free to avoid the application of the DSU to their new bargains if
they wish, the unavailability of the mechanism as an enforcement device would
rob Guzman's proposal of much of its force. In the absence of the DSU, one
might as well seek out international fora other than the WTO for the har-
monization of global rules.
As its title suggests, Guzman's article is ultimately a call for world gov-
ernment by the WTO. In this necessarily brief response, we describe some of
* Professor of Law, Northwestern University School of Law.; J.D., Harvard Law School, 1983; M.A.,
Oxford University, 1980; A.B., Harvard University, 1978.
** Professor of Law, Hofstra University School of Law. J.D., Harvard Law School, 1988; A.B., Harvard
University, 1985. The Authors wish to thank Professor Guzman and the editors of the Harvard Interna-
tional Law Journal for inviting us to respond to Professor Guzman's article. We are grateful for the com-
ments of Ken Abbot, Robert Howse, Jide Nzelibe, and Max Schanzenbach, as well as those of the par-
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1. Andrew T. Guzman, Global Governance and the WTO, 45 HARV. INT'L L.J. 303 (2004).
2. For discussions highlighting the importance of the dispute settlement system to Guzman's pro-
posal, see id. at 312, 319-20, 321-26, 329, 335-36, 350.
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the more important theoretical and practical problems that Guzman's pro-
posal presents. First, in Part II, we address the matter of cross-issue bargaining
in the WTO. While cross-issue bargaining can create gains for parties to a
contract, substantive regulatory deals may be vehicles for "amoral" wealth
transfers among interest groups.3 Unlike the present WTO, which works to
minimize the influence of one particular form of interest group--protection-
ists-the transformed organization would facilitate agreements that em-
power special interests.
In Part III, we discuss the potential of the dispute settlement system as a
credibility-enhancing device. We demonstrate why the dispute settlement sys-
tem might actually discourage cross-issue bargains by vesting extraordinary
discretion in WTO tribunals. This discretion would entail an intolerable lack of
predictability for WTO members, particularly given the sensitivity of the
matters involved. We explain why developing countries would be especially
chary of signing on to such a regime, and show how extending the dispute
settlement system to cover a variety of non-trade issues might upset the sen-
sitive dynamic in which exporters work to assure national compliance with
WTO obligations.
Finally, in our conclusion, we briefly address another possible model for
the future of the WTO, one that we have previously described at length. 4
Rather than transform itself into a global government-a World Trade, Eco-
nomic, Environment, Human Rights, Labor, and Public Health Organiza-
tion-the WTO should stick to its limited but important role: reducing barri-
ers to trade among nations.
II. CROSS-ISSUE BARGAINING IN GUZMAN'S WTO
The first major element of Guzman's proposal is his call for transforming the
WTO into a forum for cross-issue negotiation. Guzman would like to change
the WTO from an institution that focuses primarily on reducing national
barriers to trade into one that facilitates national bargaining on a variety of
non-trade topics, including the environment, labor, public health, and hu-
man rights. Guzman envisions a series of specialized departments within the
WTO that would serve as fora for "Departmental" negotiating rounds in
designated subject matters.5 These departments would be staffed by experts,
appointed by national governments but apparently with a large degree of
autonomy, who would negotiate agreements and prepare new global regula-
tions. Guzman also envisions periodic "Mega-Rounds" in which nations
would make deals that transcend departmental lines, 6 for example, rounds in
3. Jonathan R. Macey, Transactions Costs and the Normative Elements of the Public Choice Model. An Appli-
cation of Constitutional Theory, 74 VA. L. REv. 471,472 (1988).
4. John 0. McGinnis & Mark L. Movsesian, The World Trade Constitution, 114 HARV. L. REv. 511
(2000).
5. Guzman, supra note 1, at 307-08.
6. Id. at 308.
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which some nations agree to lower trade restrictions in return for other na-
tions' concessions on the environment or labor.
The underpinnings of Guzman's proposal lie in "political bargaining" the-
ory.7 As the name suggests, political bargaining theory attempts to apply the
insights of contract theory to intergovernmental negotiations. 8 Just as pri-
vate parties can increase their preference satisfaction by expanding the scope
of their bargains, governments can enhance the potential for reaching beneficial
agreements by addressing independent issues simultaneously, a practice com-
monly known as "logrolling." 9 For example, because their interests are too
far apart, developing and developed countries might not be able to reach inde-
pendent agreements on either agricultural subsidies or environmental regu-
lations. Nonetheless, they might be able to reach a compromise that covers
both subjects: developed countries might forgo some agricultural subsidies
in exchange for developing countries' agreement to somewhat higher envi-
ronmental standards. Thus, cross-issue bargaining might make both sides better
off.10
Political bargaining theory has much to offer the discussion of international
institutions. But one should not casually equate private contracts with pub-
lic regulatory bargains." Because private contracts generally enhance the
preferences of the parties, legal mechanisms that reduce transaction costs to
such contracts are likely to be beneficial.' 2 Regulatory bargains, by contrast,
are not as likely to be efficient in terms of nations' true preferences. Such
bargains are much more likely to represent "amoral" wealth transfers among
different groups of citizens:' 3 there is a considerable danger that many such
bargains would represent deals by special interests in various nations at the
public's expense. Legal mechanisms that reduce transaction costs to such
bargains thus are not as unambiguously beneficial.
The genius of the WTO lies precisely in its capacity to promote private,
cross-border contracts rather than regulatory bargains that can amount to
wealth transfers among interest groups. Three of the organization's features
help assure this. First, the WTO has a limited focus: promoting interna-
tional agreements to reduce tariff and non-tariff barriers. Such agreements
promote private contracting and, according to the theory of comparative advan-
tage, increase nations' aggregate wealth.' 4 The WTO's narrow focus thus
7. ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 51 (2000).
8. Id. at 53.
9. Seeid. at 120-21.
10. See David W. Leebron, Linkages, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 5, 12-13 (2002) (discussing "strategic link-
age").
11. On the basic distinction between private and public bargains, see Macey, supra note 3, at 472.
12. Id.
13. Id. By "amoral" we mean transfers that do not have a plausible moral justification. Transfers from
consumers to some otherwise undeserving producers' group would be a paradigm example.
14. It is true that some WTO rules, like the anti-dumping provisions, permit interference with free
trade, but even these rules generally limit the interference that would exist in the organization's absence.
See AGREEMENT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF ARTICLE VI OF THE GENERAL AGREEMENT ON TARIFFS AND
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helps assure that the international agreements it facilitates will be good for
each nation's net welfare and will not require much monitoring by national
governments and their citizens.
Second, as presently constructed, the WTO acts to mitigate one of the
most characteristic domestic wealth transfers. The WTO constrains the ability
of domestic interest groups to obtain protective tariffs-a historical bane of
democratic politics. Under the WTO regime, members reduce tariffs on a
reciprocal basis. As a result, the benefits that exporters derive from lower tariffs
abroad depend upon the willingness of the exporters' own government to
lower its tariffs with respect to foreign products. The reciprocity regime
thus creates incentives for exporters to enter the domestic political struggle
and blunt the power of the protectionist interest groups at home, providing
virtual representation for the public's interest in free trade.15 Under this view,
the WTO is a regime that facilitates democratic choice within individual
states even as it increases aggregate wealth by decreasing tariff barriers. 16
Third, the WTO's relatively light administrative structure limits the
danger that the organization will become a vehicle for wealth transfers. Gov-
ernments can easily monitor whether other nations comply with tariff reduc-
tions and nondiscrimination requirements. Exporters directly benefit from
such provisions and thus have incentives to bring violations to their govern-
ments' attention. Moreover, enforcing tariff reductions and attendant agree-
ments to remove trade restrictions does not require granting the WTO wide
substantive discretion.' 7 Thus, special interests cannot easily use WTO mecha-
nisms, such as the DSU, to obtain rents.18
In contrast, transforming the WTO into a forum for regulatory bargains
could encourage the adoption of rules that do not facilitate private contracts
and do not benefit nations' citizens as a whole. For example, interest groups
could easily take advantage of the substantive discretion that regulatory bar-
gains would necessarily confer on WTO officials. Even domestic regimes typi-
cally provide substantial discretion to those who interpret and implement
regulatory requirements, and "global governance" of the sort Guzman envi-
sions would require more discretion than domestic regulation for at least two
reasons. First, any global regulatory regime would have to take into account
TRADE 1994, in ANNEX LA TO THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
FINAL ACT EMBODYING THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIA-
TIONS, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 147 (1999).
15. See McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 4, at 545 (noting that producers who enjoy a comparative
advantage gain new markets when foreign countries reduce tariffs, which creates an incentive for such
producers to lobby for lower tariffs in their own countries).
16. Id. at 546.
17. For further elaboration on this topic, see id. at 566-72.
18. Rent is classically defined in this context as "that part of the payment to an owner of resources
over and above that which those resources could command in any alternative use." James M. Buchanan,
Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking, in TOWARD A THEORY OF THE RENT-SEEKING SOCIETY 3, 3 (James M.
Buchanan et al., eds. 1980).
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the often dramatically different circumstances of member states. Second, the
consensus requirement would make reaching agreement on the details of a
regulatory regime more difficult in the WTO than in the domestic context. 1 9
Guzman's proposal would thus require substantial discretion to be lodged
in WTO tribunals, a matter we discuss below. 20 One should note, however,
that drafting discretion enjoyed by "departmental" experts also would pro-
vide an opportunity for interest groups to exercise deleterious influence over
the content of global regulations. Interest groups have substantially more
power at the global than at the domestic level. Average citizens find the in-
ternational process even more opaque than domestic lawmaking and thus
would have more difficulty monitoring those charged with fashioning global
regulatory policy.2' Moreover, the global scale of regulation allows greater rents
for interest groups. If business groups could obtain international interven-
tion in their favor, they could disable a world's worth of competitors.2 2
In addition, departmental staffers themselves may have interests that di-
verge from the interests of their appointing authorities. 23 Given the techni-
cal and esoteric nature of much of their work, staffers may eventually consti-
tute a distinctive class with a distinctive interest-growing the regulatory
apparatus of the WTO-that does not reflect the goals of domestic govern-
ments, let alone the general public. 24 Moreover, because developing countries
have relatively fewer personnel and resources to devote to the project, de-
partmental staff from the developed world are likely to exercise dispropor-
tionate influence, a disparity that will only exacerbate the distrust that de-
veloping countries already feel toward the WTO, a matter we discuss further
below.
Guzman responds to these concerns by noting that national governments,
which would have the ultimate decision about entering into any new global
regulatory agreements, remain accountable to their citizens, and by stressing
19. The consensus requirement would also make it difficult for members to "overrule" an Appellate
Body decision, a fact that Guzman acknowledges. See Guzman, supra note 1, at 347.
20. Guzman expressly disavows a commission model in which WTO bureaucrats would have author-
ity to implement the new regulations. See id. at 341. As a result, he argues, his proposal avoids the danger
of interest-group capture. While the absence of a commission surely reduces the danger of interest group
capture, it does not do all that much to eliminate it. As we explain below, Guzman's proposal necessarily
entails substantial discretion on the part of WTO tribunals. If these tribunals exercise large substantive
discretion-for instance, to formulate a precise balance between environment and trade-interest groups
would likely exert power through their governments on appointments to the tribunals. For more on the
problem of discretion in the dispute settlement process, see infra at 361.
21. See Paul B. Stephan, Accountability and International Lawmaking: Rules, Rents and Legitimacy, 17 Nw.
J. INT'L. L. & Bus. 681, 699-702 (1996-97) (explaining that citizens face higher costs monitoring in-
ternational rules than domestic rules).
22. Cf Frank Easterbrook, The State of Madison's Vision of the State: A Public Choice Perspective, 107
HARv. L. REv. 1328, 1337-38 (1994).
23. See Jose E. Alvarez, The WTO as Linkage Machine, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 146, 150 (2002) ("Trade in-
siders, like other bureaucratic agents, may develop their own agendas at the expense of the state princi-
pals that most of them serve.").
24. For discussion of the rise of a network of international regulators, see Anne Marie Slaughter, The
Real New World Order, FOREIGN AFF., Sept.-Oct. 1997, at 183, 189.
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the unanimity requirement for action in the WTO.25 Neither of these re-
sponses is entirely persuasive. National governments themselves operate un-
der the influence of interest groups and might well enter into global deals
that help those interests at the expense of the general public. Again, because
these global deals would arise in remote alien fora, citizens would have less
ability to monitor them. Guzman's proposal thus would turn the WTO from a
Madisonian organization that checks the power of protectionist groups into
one that empowers such groups at a global level.
The consensus requirement tempers this danger but would not prevent it;
every nation has protectionist groups to pay off and regulatory bargaining
would permit the logrolling of their disparate interests within the WTO.
Moreover, the unanimity rule may create regulatory lock-in problems-once
made, the regulations would be quite difficult to change.2 6 The consensus
requirement would thus exacerbate a difficulty that exists in all international
harmonized regulatory regimes: the stifling of jurisdictional competition that
leads to regulatory innovation demanded by the fast-paced modern world.
Thus, given the large agency costs and other problems of international
regulation, we believe that the WTO should not be a forum for the substan-
tive regulatory bargains that Guzman envisions. This is not to say that in-
ternational regulatory regimes never would be appropriate-they may be, in
limited circumstances involving spillovers-only that Guzman has not
shown that the WTO is a promising venue for their negotiation. 27 It would
be difficult for the WTO to set up constitutive rules that would limit its
jurisdiction to the relatively small set of international regulations that make
sense.28 Particularly given the practical problems of formulating global regula-
tions and the dangers they would pose to the DSU, which we discuss below,
we do not believe that Guzman has shown that it is best to undertake inter-
national regulation in the WTO rather than in some other context.
Guzman argues that his model follows on the Agreement on Trade-Related
Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement), which already
represents an expansion of the WTO into substantive, non-trade regulation. 29
25. Guzman, supra note 1, at 337-38.
26. See John 0. McGinnis, The Political Economy of International Antitrust Harmonization, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 549, 552 (2003) (discussing lock-in problems).
27. We do think that the scope for international regulation is far less than Guzman seems to believe.
Because of interest group influence and the reduction of regulatory competition, international regulation
to resolve externalities may cause more welfare losses than gains. See John 0. McGinnis, The Political
Economy ofGlobal Multilateralism, 1 CHI. INT'L. L.J. 381, 394-95 (2000).
28. Domestic regimes create constitutional mechanisms such as the enumeration of limited powers,
separation of powers, and bicameralism to limit the danger of amoral wealth transfers. See Macey, supra
note 3, at 494-95. The international system lacks these reticulated governance mechanisms and institu-
tions, like our Supreme Court, with the legitimacy to enforce them.
29. Guzman, supra note 1, at 308. Guzman also argues that the WTO has "substantive rules on ...
health and safety, environmental regulation, and more," id. at 350, but does not specify the content of
such substantive rules. We have argued previously, to the contrary, that the WTO generally permits
nation states to choose their own substantive regulations subject only to certain procedure-oriented tests
that attempt to ferret out protectionist regulations. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 4, at 573-83.
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But, as economists have argued, substantive intellectual property protections
may be more suitable for inclusion in the WTO than other standards because a
variety of factors, most particularly their very close connection to trade and
their amenability to dispute resolution, distinguish them from other sub-
stantive regulations. 30 Moreover, the TRIPs Agreement fits within the tradi-
tion of protecting the property of aliens against expropriation, a venerable
rule of international law.31 Finally, even in domestic regimes like our own,
there is a tradition of protecting intellectual property from the center while
leaving other regulations to subsidiary institutions. 32 This historical practice
suggests that the balance between the need for centralized regulation and
the danger of amoral wealth transfers is different with respect to intellectual
property than with respect to other substantive regulation.
As a practical matter, too, the TRIPs Agreement stands apart from other
attempts to expand the WTO into substantive regulation. Further progress
in the trade regime could not have been made if exporters of intellectual prop-
erty knew their property would be taken upon export; these exporters would
have had no interest in having tariffs reduced abroad if their goods could
simply be pirated. 33 Yet intellectual property exporters were key in battling
against protectionist groups, such as textile producers, in the developed
world. The TRIPs Agreement was thus central to the "grand bargain" of the
Uruguay Round that made the WTO possible. 34 In contrast, members of the
WTO today seem reluctant to add new subject matters to the organiza-
tion.35
Finally, we should say a word about Guzman's proposed departmental struc-
ture. Guzman believes that separate subject-matter departments--departments
of environment, labor, and the like-would facilitate Mega-Rounds by elu-
cidating issues and resolving certain topics ahead of time.36 The advantages,
however, would likely be fewer than Guzman imagines. Whatever agree-
30. See Keith E. Maskus, Regulatory Standards in the WTO: Comparing Intellectual Property Rights with
Competition Policy, Environmental Protection, and Core Labor Standards (Jan. 2000), Institute for International
Economics, available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/2000/00-I.htm (last visited May 1, 2004).
Maskus argues that competition standards may be another candidate for inclusion in the WTO, but these
issues could be addressed through antidiscrimination rules that would simply deepen the national treat-
ment principle that is already part of the WTO regime. See McGinnis, supra note 26, at 581-85.
31. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 712(1) (1987) (generally requiring
compensation for the expropriation of intellectual property). See also Jerome H. Reichmann, Enforcing the
Enforcement Procedures ofthe TRIPS Agreement, 37 VA. J. INT'L L. 335, 356 (1997) (suggesting the TRIPs
Agreement is an extension of this principle).
32. The U.S. Constitution not only granted the federal government authority to remove trade barriers
through the Commerce Clause but also to harmonize intellectual property rights. See U.S. CONST. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 8. In contrast, before the New Deal, the U.S. Constitution was not interpreted to grant the fed-
eral government general authority over health, safety, or labor regulations.
33. See John H. Barton, The Economics of TRIPS: International Trade in Information-Intensive Products, 33
GEO. WASH. INT'L L. REV. 473, 484 (2001).
34. See Joel P. Trachtman, Institutional Linkage: Transcending "Trade and. , 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 77,
78-79 (2002) (discussing this "grand bargain").
35. We discuss this matter infra at note 60 and accompanying text.
36. Guzman, supra note 1, at 310-12.
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ments the parties reach about substantive standards in Departmental Rounds,
the critical point would still occur in the Mega-Rounds, during which par-
ties would have to decide how to balance trade and other concerns. Because,
by definition, the Departmental Rounds would not have authority to con-
sider such cross-issue balancing, they could do little to assist this ultimate
endeavor or to determine which precise cross-issue bargains would be added
to the agenda of any particular Mega-Round.
Moreover, departmental staffers would likely seek to aggrandize their po-
sitions by influencing negotiations in other departments.37 Guzman recog-
nizes this concern, but argues that the boundaries among departments would be
'self-enforcing" 38 because member states would be in a position to mediate
jurisdictional conflicts. As we have explained, however, given the high costs
of monitoring, staffers will likely have a large degree of day-to-day auton-
omy from national governments and interests that diverge from those of
their appointing authorities. Controlling staffers' activities thus would be a
burdensome task, especially for developing countries that lack resources to
devote to the project.
III. THE LIMITS OF THE DSU AS A CREDIBILITY-ENHANCING DEVICE
Unless they agree otherwise, the members' new regulatory agreements would
be subject to the DSU. 39 Guzman believes that the dispute settlement sys-
tem can serve as a credibility-enhancing device for members' regulatory
commitments. The availability of a rigorous third-party enforcement mecha-
nism would enhance members' confidence in the durability of their regula-
tory bargains, thus increasing members' "ability ... to make welfare-increasing
deals."'40 The prospect of losing the many advantages of these deals would
discourage members from leaving the new organization in response to ad-
verse rulings by panels or the Appellate Body.41
The idea that third-party enforcement can induce beneficial bargaining is
an important part of the contracts literature. 42 Unfortunately, significant obsta-
cles stand in the way of applying this insight to an expanded WTO. Indeed,
given the enlarged substantive jurisdiction that Guzman envisions, one would
expect a strong enforcement mechanism actually to inhibit bargaining
among member states.
To see why this is so, recall that nations have widely divergent policy pref-
erences on regulatory matters because of their differing political, cultural, and
economic backgrounds. To take account of these differences under Guzman's
37. Guzman envisions at least informal contacts among experts in different WTO departments. See id.
at 330-31.
38. Id. at 331 n.43.
39. Id. at 312.
40. Id. at 320.
41. Seeid. at 326-28.
42. See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits ofContract Law, 113 YALE
L.J. 541,562, 568 (2003).
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model, nations would have two choices. They could either hammer out de-
tailed agreements that reconcile their varying demands, or they could draft
broad agreements that leave substantial discretion to later adjudicators. Be-
cause negotiating detailed agreements on these sensitive matters would en-
tail substantial transactions costs, particularly given the WTO's unanimity
rule, nations would not favor that option.43
But the second option, the one that Guzman apparently endorses, would
likely make members uncomfortable as well. Third-party dispute settlement
can enhance the credibility of parties' commitments only where the parties
trust the adjudicative process.44 In the WTO context, members must have
confidence that WTO tribunals will objectively assess the facts of members'
disputes and enforce members' bargains as written, without adding to mem-
bers' obligations or adopting expansive or idiosyncratic interpretations. Other-
wise, the "effectiveness" of the process itself will be an obstacle to reaching
agreement, as members rationally would avoid binding themselves ex ante
to a coercive mechanism that threatens to produce biased or unpredictable
results.
The difficulty with Guzman's proposal is that it necessarily would confer
extraordinary discretion on WTO tribunals that would undermine the pre-
dictability of the dispute settlement process. As we have explained, the
agreements that the tribunals would be called to interpret are likely to be
broadly worded documents that provide substantial room for interpretive
judgment. As Guzman himself recognizes, gaps and new issues would be
inevitable. 45 Since one of Guzman's objectives is to reconcile trade with other
values, such gaps will almost surely give the tribunals discretion to engage
in relatively open-ended balancing among objectives. 46 Members could
never be certain that the bargains would be interpreted as they expect. In-
deed, members could easily conclude that the risk of unpredictable and un-
favorable exercises of discretion by WTO tribunals would outweigh the
benefits of the new agreements.
Developing countries would be particularly chary of signing on to such a
regime. These countries, which often have views at odds with Western no-
43. One could also explain this point using the concept of bounded rationality. Reconciling the com-
peting circumstances and demands of member nations in the context of cross-issue bargaining would be
an extraordinarily complex endeavor. As a result, the negotiators would likely adopt cognitive shortcuts,
such as vague standards that leave substantial substantive discretion in later adjudicators. See Adam J.
Hirsch, Cognitive Jurisprudence, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1331, 1342 (2003) (explaining how lawmakers'
bounded rationality might lead them to prefer standards to bright-line rules).
44. See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 42, at 562 (explaining how lack of "enforcement rules and honest
courts" in certain countries weakens the credibility of promises that local parties make to outside inves-
tors).
45. See Guzman, supra note 1, at 347.
46. By increasing the range of possible positions in a dispute, such open-ended, cross-issue balancing
might also complicate the problem of vote "cycling" in the Appellate Body. For more on how vote cy-
cling in multi-member appellate tribunals can lead to unstable decisions, see Frank H. Easterbrook, Ways
of Criticizing the Court, 95 HARV. L. REv. 802, 815-17 (1982); Adrian Vermeule, The Cycles of Statutory
Interpretation, 68 U. CHI. L. REv. 149, 172-74 (2001).
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tions of environmental and labor protections, already harbor suspicions
about pro-Western bias in the WTO. 47 Granting WTO bureaucrats greater
discretion would only exacerbate the problem. Developing countries could
easily foresee the danger that, over time, WTO tribunals would transform
broad treaty language about the environment or labor into detailed require-
ments backed up by the threat of retaliation. Moreover, because developing
countries often lack the litigating resources that developed countries enjoy,
they may rationally fear an inability to present their case successfully.
Thus, the prospect of an "effective" dispute settlement system may actu-
ally retard, rather than encourage, cross-issue bargaining by member states.
Moreover, expansion may undermine the legitimacy of the dispute resolution
process. WTO tribunals would necessarily rule on the proper balance between
the competing demands of trade and important non-trade values like public
health and human rights. Because the WTO lacks the ties of history, cul-
ture, and, most importantly, democratic accountability that tend to support
domestic governments, local populations are unlikely to see WTO rulings
on such sensitive matters as legitimate. 48 Thus, rather than promote mem-
bers' compliance with the new global regulatory regime, WTO rulings on
substantive questions could actually encourage a nationalist backlash that
makes such compliance less likely.
Guzman addresses some of these concerns, but the solutions he advocates
are unpersuasive. For example, Guzman recognizes that requiring members
to subject their new agreements to the WTO's dispute settlement system may
inhibit bargaining. 49 He argues, therefore, that the mechanism should oper-
ate only as a default rule: members should be free to exclude the application
of the dispute procedures to new agreements. 50 But this solution robs Guz-
man's proposal of much of its force. If the WTO's "effective" dispute settle-
ment system were not available to enforce the new regulatory bargains, har-
nessing the organization as a forum for cross-issue negotiations would lack
one of its salient rationales. Nations could always find some other suprana-
tional institution, like the United Nations, to host their discussions. Moreo-
ver, as Guzman himself notes, without dispute resolution and the prospect
of sanctions it authorizes, nations may have little incentive to comply with
parts of the cross-issue agreements they find burdensome. As we observe below,
nations often do not comply with agreements they sign on human rights and
other issues. The dispute settlement system thus presents something of a
dilemma for Guzman. Subjecting the new agreements to the DSU may in-
hibit bargaining, but allowing nations to opt out of WTO enforcement
47. SeeJagdish Bhagwati, Afterword: The Question of Linkage, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 126, 128 (2002).
48. See Mark L. Movsesian, Sovereignty, Compliance, and the World Trade Organization: Lessons From the
History of Supreme Court Review, 20 MICH. J. INT'L L. 775, 816-17 (1999).
49. Guzman, supra note 1, at 324.
50. Id. at 324-25.
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greatly undermines Guzman's argument for turning to the WTO in the first
place.
Guzman also addresses the danger of excessive discretion on the part of WTO
adjudicators. For example, he recognizes that, as trade experts, panelists and
Appellate Body members may display a systematic bias in favor of trade as
opposed to other values. In resolving disputes under a new trade-and-
environment treaty, for example, the adjudicators might routinely slight the
environmental values that the treaty tried to advance. To address this prob-
lem, Guzman argues that the pool of potential adjudicators should include
experts "in all relevant fields." 51 Indeed, "the best panelists would probably
have knowledge of more than one" substantive area.52
In response to the claim that excessive discretion would render WTO rulings
less democratically legitimate, Guzman advocates a kind of judicial restraint.
He argues that WTO adjudicators, who are less accountable than their do-
mestic counterparts, should avoid using the dispute settlement process as a
vehicle for free-form policymaking. 53 They should stick to interpreting
WTO agreements and resist the temptation to supplement those instruments
with the requirements of other treaties or customary international law.
Once again, Guzman's proposed solutions seem unpersuasive and some-
what in tension with one another. While broadening the range of panelists'
expertise might ameliorate pro-trade bias, it would do nothing to make
WTO dispute resolution more predictable. Indeed, stocking WTO panels
with policy mavens would, in all likelihood, render dispute resolution less
faithful to the parties' original bargains. The more that panelists were cho-
sen for their substantive expertise, rather than their proficiency in trade law,
the more likely they would be to act as beneficent guardians, imposing their
own visions of the "best" balance between trade and non-trade values, rather
than as humble interpreters of legal documents.
Thus, Guzman's call for an increased diversity of substantive expertise on
the part of panelists is at odds with his laudable concern for judicial restraint.
Moreover, given the technological gap between the developed and the devel-
oping world, the experts Guzman envisions likely would come dispropor-
tionately from the West: they would have Western educations, Western cre-
dentials, and Western notions about the linkages between trade and other
values. The predominance of such experts among the pool of panelists would
only increase the unease developing countries would feel about their pros-
pects for a sympathetic hearing.
An additional argument militates against expanding the coverage of the
dispute settlement system. One important reason why the WTO's dispute
settlement process has been so successful is its capacity to enlist the efforts of
51. Id. at 335.
52. Id. Guzman recognizes that not every individual panelist can be expected to have such breadth of
knowledge; his focus is on the expertise of the pool of panelists as a whole. See id. at 335 n.123.
53. Seeid. at 343.
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exporters in an offending country. Once the Dispute Settlement Body has
ruled that a member's law violates WTO requirements, the complaining coun-
try may retaliate by raising tariffs on that member's exports. The threat of
retaliation creates incentives for exporters in the target country to lobby for
the removal of the WTO-inconsistent measure. 54
Applying the WTO's dispute settlement procedures to a large variety of
non-trade subjects might compromise this dynamic. Exporters could find them-
selves the targets in a multitude of matters that would seem quite tangential
to their concerns. They might suffer WTO-sanctioned retaliation because of
their government's anti-pollution policies, minimum-wage laws, or rules
about capital punishment. If exporters came to feel that the WTO was im-
posing burdens on their products in order to advance an expanding list of
non-trade values, they might well reduce their efforts to lobby for the main-
tenance of the WTO regime. The regime as a Whole would no longer be as
beneficial to them as it was before. 55
Finally, even if all these problems could be surmounted, the capacity of
the dispute settlement system to deal with sensitive matters like the envi-
ronment and labor remains doubtful. Enforcement of WTO obligations in
the dispute settlement system depends on the ability and willingness of mem-
bers to identify violations and bring complaints against nations that violate
their commitments. But members would find it much more difficult to
monitor whether other members were complying with substantive regula-
tory standards than whether other members were honoring tariff reductions
and nondiscrimination principles. Moreover, even if members know of viola-
tions by others, members may lack appropriate incentives to bring actions.
After all, nations rarely attempt seriously to enforce, through sanctions or
otherwise, other nations' compliance with existing human rights and labor
standards.5 6 It is unclear why amalgamating such issues into the WTO would
provide more appropriate incentives for action. 57 And of course, if members
choose to avoid enforcement of their new obligations through the DSU, as
Guzman believes they should be free to do, the advantages of placing the
new agreements in the WTO would be greatly diminished.
IV. CONCLUSION
Guzman appears to believe that the only alternative to his proposal is stagna-
tion at the WTO. We have another model for progress that we have outlined
54. See Mark L. Movsesian, Enforcement of WTO Rulings: An Interest Group Analysis, 32 HOFSTRA L.
REv. 1, 10 (2003).
55. See McGinnis, supra note 26, at 589.
56. See, e.g., Oona A. Hathaway, Do Human Rights Treaties Make a Difference?, 111 YALE L.J. 1935,
1940 (2002) (noting that noncompliance with obligations of human rights treaties "appears to be com-
mon").
57. Insofar as nations have new kinds of incentives, they will often come predominantly from indus-
tries that will be directly advantaged by trade sanctions, thus confirming that expansion of the WTO
may retard its core purpose of removing trade barriers.
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in more detail elsewhere. 58 Instead of adding new regulatory issues that are
not closely connected to trade, the objective of the WTO should be to broaden
the scope of tariff reductions and nondiscrimination rules that facilitate pri-
vate transactions around the globe. This approach would permit nation-states to
be the major fora for the expression of non-trade values. So long as they
honor tariff reductions and do not discriminate against foreign goods and
services, nations could set their own policies for their own jurisdictions. 59
This would be a better way to inject non-trade values into political govern-
ance.
The Doha Round is largely following our prescription by focusing on broad-
ening the range of goods and services to which free trade principles apply. Tell-
ingly, negotiators are in the process of jettisoning the notion of binding
regulations on the most controversial non-trade subjects (some of the so-
called "Singapore issues"), such as competition rules, on which a few mem-
bers, primarily European nations, were insisting. 60 Even without such sub-
jects, much scope for bargaining for the reduction of barriers to private con-
tracts remains. The United States and other developed nations can eliminate
industrial tariffs and agricultural subsidies in return for developing nations'
agreement to open up markets in services and to cut tariffs on goods with
respect to which developed nations have a comparative advantage. WTO mem-
bers can continue to refine prohibitions against discriminatory treatment
that blocks imports, providing WTO tribunals with the elements of a pro-
cedure-oriented jurisprudence that limits substantive discretion. The economic
growth created by expanded trade would provide WTO members with more
resources to address social problems according to their own values; members
would remain free to collaborate on the relatively few issues where spillovers
could be addressed successfully. This program represents a surer-if more
indirect and incremental-path, not only to economic prosperity, but to im-
provements in the environment, labor, public health, and human rights around
the world.
58. McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 4.
59. For the reasons that the WTO appropriately does not countenance imposition of such policies ex-
traterritorially, see McGinnis & Movsesian, supra note 4, at 583-88.
60. See European Trade Chief Calls for Global Framework by May, AGENCE FRANCE PRESSE,
Feb. 26, 2004, available at 2004 WL 71449914 (suggesting that nations would not have to abide by
rules on competition or investment as part of the next global trade deal).

